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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The City believes that Majestic's Brief requires a response 
in several areas. First, Majestic suggests that their award of 
compensation for an interest in the land was supported by 
substantial competent evidence- Acceptance of this argument 
would result in Majestic being compensated twice for the value 
of the buildings and improvements. Close examination of the 
evidence put forth in both Appellant's and Respondents' Brief 
reveals that only the evidence cited by the City refers to land 
value. The evidence which Majestic would have the court rely on 
clearly applies to not only land value, but also the value of 
the buildings and improvements on the land. Majestic had 
already received compensation for these buildings and 
improvements and to include them again in an analysis of land 
value is clearly erroneous. 
The second issue involves the standard of review in this 
case. Although it is correct that for certain issues the 
"clearly erroneous" standard of review should be used, it is 
also important for the court to note that other issues should be 
reviewed upon a "correctness" standard. More specifically, the 
trial court's failure to value the property as if unencumbered, 
and the trial court's interpretation of the condemnation clause 
contained in the lease, are both Conclusions of Law. This court 
should review those Conclusions under a "correctness" standard 
and give no preferential treatment to the trial court's 
decision. Furthermore, the evidence demonstrates that the 
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incorrect Conclusions of Law by the trial court resulted in 
Majestic being awarded excess value. 
It is also important that this Court note that West Valley 
City has not waived any rights with regard to this appeal. 
Majestic has suggested that a letter offering Partial 
Satisfaction of Judgment, which was specifically rejected by 
Majestic, has somehow bound the City into waiving its rights to 
appeal portions of the Judgment. Majestic has completely 
misstated the facts regarding the Partial Satisfaction of 
Judgment, which is clearly demonstrated by correspondence from 
Majestic and the language of the Partial Satisfaction itself. 
Finally, Majestic's contention that the City's Brief does 
not comply with the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure is without 
merit. The City's Brief is concise and complete, and provides 
the court with an understanding of the errors that were made, 
where in the record those errors were found, and why relief is 
necessary. Attempts, such as this, to put form over substance 
should not be considered by this court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPELLANT HAS MET ITS BURDEN OF MARSHALLING ALL 
EVIDENCE REGARDING MAJESTIC irS SHARE OF THE VALUE OF 
THE LAND. THAT EVIDENCE CLEARLY DEMONSTRATES THAT 
MAJESTIC HAD NO BONUS VALUE IN THE LAND. 
Majestic asserts that the finding of a compensable interest 
in the value of the land was supported by substantial competent 
evidence at trial. Without close examination of the testimony, 
this may appear to be true; however, Majestic has missed the 
point of this argument and their reliance on their appraiser, 
Mr. Webber's testimony, is misplaced. 
Majestic cites several pages in the transcript wherein Mr. 
Webber testified as to Majestic's compensable interest in the 
"land". Upon closer examination, his testimony concerns a bonus 
value based upon Majestic's "land, buildings and improvements". 
Majestic has even conceded as much in their Brief. (Majestic 
Brief, p. 27) 
The extensive quotations from the record contained in West 
Valley City's Brief present evidence on the issue of land value 
only. The value of the buildings and improvements is not 
considered at that point. That is clearly the correct analysis 
in this case. Majestic's interest in the buildings and 
improvements upon the land is specifically allocated under the 
terms of the lease. That allocation was taken into account by 
the trial court which awarded Majestic the sum of $223,665.00 as 
their compensable interest in the buildings and improvements. 
Majestic is now suggesting that the inclusion of the value of 
buildings and improvements in a determination of land value was 
proper. The portions of the transcript cited by Majestic are 
inapplicable to a discussion of the issue of land value only. 
With one exception, West Valley City's Brief sets forth all 
of the evidence put forth at trial regarding the value of the 
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land only. That exception was a portion of redirect examination 
of Mr, Webber in which he stated that: 
"Under that scenario the contract rent as called for 
between the Pickrell, as lessor, and Majestic, as 
lessee, is equal to the contract length as called for 
in the Majestic to the Prudential leases, therefore, 
there is no measurable interest," (R. 375, p, 79) 
Mr, Webber went on to say that his determination of total value 
changed because of the buildings and improvements constructed by 
Majestic. Based upon this analysis of the evidence, it is clear 
that there exists no evidence whatsoever that Majestic had a 
compensable interest in the land. Majestic's compensable 
interest in this case is derived solely from the buildings and 
improvements which they constructed upon the property and the 
trial court awarded them compensation for those buildings and 
improvements based upon the lease provisions. While West Valley 
City certainly agrees that Majestic is entitled to compensation 
for the buildings and improvements, it is equally important that 
there should be no recovery where there has been no loss. 
(Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, Inc., v. State of New 
York, 22 N.Y.2d 75, 238 N.E.2d 705, 291 N.Y.S.2d 299, 210 
(1968)) Majestic has utterly failed to demonstrate any evidence 
that they have a compensable interest in the land. All their 
evidence pertains to compensable interest in the buildings and 
improvements, and Majestic is not entitled to receive 
compensation twice for the same buildings and improvements; 
therefore, the trial court's awarding compensation to Majestic 
for land value was clearly erroneous. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT II 
THE STANDARD IN THIS CASE MUST VARY WITH THE ISSUES, 
CERTAIN ISSUES SHOULD BE REVIEWED ON A CORRECTNESS 
STANDARD. 
Majestic is correct in its analysis of the use of the 
"clearly erroneous" standard with regard to contracts 
interpreted by use of parol evidence. However, other issues in 
this appeal should be reviewed under the "correctness" standard. 
A. The Trial Court's Failure to Value the Property As a 
Whole Unit, As If Unencumbered, Prior to Apportionincr the Value 
Between the Fee Holder and Lease Holders, Should Be Reviewed 
Under the Correctness Standard. 
The trial judge's decision not to value the property 
as if unencumbered is clearly a legal conclusion and not a 
finding of fact, and therefore does not fall within the "clearly 
erroneous" standard set forth in Rule 52A, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Judge Russon, in his Conclusions of Law, stated that 
the value of the property should be determined as a whole and 
then the same apportioned among the several owners according to 
their respective interests or estates. (R. 356-357) While this 
is not a misstatement of the law, it is an incomplete statement 
of the law. It is not just the value of the whole that should 
be determined, but it is the value of the unencumbered whole. 
The law in the State of Utah is clear that the leased 
property should be valued as though it were held in a single 
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ownership, rather than by separately evaluating the interests of 
the lessor and the lessee. This concept is set forth at 29A 
C.J.S. "Eminent Domain", §198, and has been specifically adopted 
by the Utah Supreme Court. (Oqden City v. Stephens, (Utah 1975) 
445 P.2d 703, (1968) 21 Utah 2d 336; see also State Road 
Commission v. Brown, 531 P. 2d 1294 (Utah 1975)) A detailed 
discussion of the law is found in Appellant's Brief at pages 23 
and 24. Utah -does not stand alone in taking this view. Even 
cases cited as authority in Respondent's Brief state that, 
" . . .where there are two or more interests or estates in a 
condemned parcel, the proper mode of assessing damages is to 
ascertain first the damage to the fee as if it were 
unencumbered, and then to apportion that amount among all of the 
estates and interests which are held in the property, (citations 
omitted)" (emphasis added) (Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea 
Company, Inc., supra) 
The trial judge not only omitted the "unencumbered" factor 
from the determination, but specifically held that the Majestic-
Prudential and Majestic-Lockhart leases "should and must be 
taken into consideration in determining the fair market value of 
the property and the property interests in question." (R. 313, 
354) (Also see Page 5 of Ruling, attached as Addendum 1.) 
This clear error by the trial judge renders the Brown 
concept that the parts shall never exceed the unencumbered whole 
meaningless. Obviously if the parts, in this case the Majestic-
Prudential and Majestic-Lockhart leases, are included when 
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determining the value of the whole, then the whole will become 
the sum of the parts. In this scenario, where the value of the 
parts are used to help determine the value of the whole, there 
will never be a situation in which the parts exceed the whole 
and the rules as set forth in the Ogden City and State Road 
Commission v. Brown cases will be rendered useless. 
It is also clear from the evidence that Majestic's 
appraiser, Mr. Webber, took the leases into account during his 
appraisal process. In his direct examination, while describing 
his various appraisal methods, he responded as follows: 
Q And did you take into account the leases that 
were on the property, on the subject property? 
A Yes, I did, 
Q What leases? Would you identify them just by 
general description, please, that you took into account? 
A There were actually three leases on the property. 
There was a land lease with a Pickrell or Granger Shopping 
Center as the lessor, and Majestic Investment Company as 
the lessee. That lease secured Majestic's position in the 
property, there were also individual leases from Majestic 
as the lessor to the Lockhart Company as lessee, and 
Majestic as lessor to Prudential as lessee. 
Q And what importance did those leases have to you? 
A Those leases because they were, No. 1, they were 
encumbering the fee estate. The land lease was encumbering 
the fee estate. Also Majestic in a leasehold position was 
secured by those leases. They had great importance to the 
valuation of this particular property. 
Q In what regard? 
A In the value of income producing property, the 
basic premise is that an income producing property sales in 
relationship to its capacity or its capability to produce 
income. The higher the income stream a property can 
produce, the higher its value. If the property has a low 
income stream, it would have a lower value. So, the income 
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stream is a very important consideration in the appraisal 
of real estate, 
Q Were the particular parties as to whom the leases 
involved, I think you mentioned them. Were they of 
interest to you in your assignment of determining fair 
market value of both the total properties and Majestic's 
interest? 
A Yes, they were, 
(R, 374, pp, 85-86) 
Also, Mr, Webber, upon questioning by the court, testified that 
the value may have been different if the leases had been for a 
shorter term. (R. 374, pp. 146-153) 
If his determination of value of the property is dependent 
upon the term of the leaseholds, then the leaseholds must have 
been used in the calculation of value. Obviously, if he uses 
the leaseholds to determine value, then he is finding the value 
of the encumbered whole, rather than the unencumbered whole. 
Mr. Webber later testifies that what he has calculated is 
the "property in fee" as if "the underlying land and 
improvements were owned by one person", and "This is for the 
total property." (R. 374 p. 154, lines 13-15, 19-20) However, 
his earlier testimony, quoted and cited above, certainly reveals 
that he did not value the property as if unencumbered. In fact, 
immediately after testifying that this was fee value, "...the 
total property", he agreed that "total property" meant the 
underlying ownership of Pickrell, together with that of 
Majestic. (R. 374, p. 154, lines 21-25) As this testimony 
clearly demonstrates, Mr. Webber not only took the leases into 
account, but contrary to law, he also considered the specific 
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identity of the lessee's as he determined the "fair market value 
of both the total properties and Majestic's interest". This 
approach, which was allowed by the trial court's interpretation 
of law, is in direct conflict with the law of this State. 
Should this ruling be allowed to stand, the Qgden City and Brown 
cases will have been circumvented and the total value of the 
property inflated. The ruling by the trial court was an 
improper application of the law which lead to improper valuation 
and should be reviewed by this court under the correctness 
standard. 
B. The Trial Court's Interpretation of the Lease 
Condemnation Clause Should Be Reviewed Under a Correctness 
Standard. 
The trial court ruled that the condemnation clause in 
the ground lease between Majestic and the landowner did not 
operate to terminate the rights of Majestic upon condemnation by 
West Valley City. The court received no parol evidence on this 
issue, and therefore it should be reviewed under a correctness 
standard. The terms and provisions of the contract were 
interpreted as a matter of law and the trial court's 
interpretation should be accorded no particular weight. 
(Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714 (Utah 1985)) 
Majestic, in its Brief, focuses only on the first sentence 
of the condemnation clause, and based upon that sentence 
suggests that Majestic's right to share in the compensation 
award did not terminate. However, in interpreting the meaning 
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of the condemnation clause, the court must read the entire 
clause, giving effect to all of its terms. (Pepsi Cola 
Metropolitan Bottling Company v. Romley, 587 P. 2d 994 (Ariz. 
App. 1978)) Upon reading the express language of the entire 
condemnation clause, which takes up almost a page of the lease, 
it becomes clear that the purpose of this clause is to terminate 
the rights of Majestic as to any interests in the land and to 
preserve the rights of Majestic as to interests in the buildings 
and improvements which they constructed on the property. In 
particular, the court should note the final sentence of the 
condemnation clause which provides that: 
"If land only is condemned, with no effect 
upon the improvement or rentals, lessor and 
any secured party holding a lessee mortgage 
on the above-described premises that is 
affected by such condemnation shall share 
in such award as their interests may 
appear." 
This demonstrates that the clear intent of the parties was that 
Majestic not participate in any award of compensation for land 
value. The middle portion of the condemnation clause contains 
a formula by which Majestic shall share in the compensation 
award that represents the value of the buildings. 
When read as a whole, the only way to harmonize all of the 
provisions of the condemnation clause is to determine that it 
was the intent of the parties that Majestic share in only the 
value of the buildings erected on the property and not the value 
of the land that is being condemned. This is further evidenced 
by the fact that Majestic specifically designed the ground lease 
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portions of the Prudential and Lockhart leases so that they 
provided the exact same rental to Majestic as Majestic was 
paying to the landowner. This pass-through arrangement of rent 
on the land clearly shows that it was the intent of the parties 
that Majestic have no interest in the land, but only in the 
buildings and improvements. 
With no other evidence offered defining the terms of the 
condemnation provision, the plain terms of the lease provision 
apportioning the award should govern. The trial court's 
interpretation of the condemnation clause and award of 
compensation for Majestic's "land value" was clearly in error 
and should be reviewed by this court under the correctness 
standard. Majestic's claim is limited to its value in the 
buildings and improvements as allocated by the express 
provisions of the lease. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT III 
WEST VALLEY CITY HAS NOT WAIVED ANY RIGHTS WITH REGARD 
TO THIS APPEAL, 
West Valley City has not waived any rights with regard to 
this appeal. 
Majestic has asserted that West Valley City has waived its 
rights to appeal certain portions of the trial court's judgment 
because of a partial satisfaction of that judgment. As Majestic 
is well aware, this is not the case. 
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To substantiate its claim that West Valley City has waived 
its rights, Majestic attached a letter from J. Richard Catten, 
dated November 3, 1989, offering a Partial Satisfaction of 
Judgment. (Respondent's Brief, Addendum 6) This offer for 
partial satisfaction was specifically rejected by the letter of 
Majestic's counsel, Robert S. Campbell, Jr., of November 18, 
1989, which is attached to this Brief as Addendum 2. The basis 
for rejection was that a partial satisfaction of judgment could 
not be made for a specific portion of the judgment. Majestic is 
now attempting to rely on a document that they specifically 
rejected for the very reasons they now embrace, in order to 
support their spurious argument that the City has waived its 
rights. 
Following negotiation, all language with regard to 
buildings and improvements was deleted from the Partial 
Satisfaction of Judgment. Furthermore, the final paragraph of 
that document states specifically that, "It is further 
acknowledged that this Partial Satisfaction of Judgment shall 
have no effect on the rights, standings or obligations of the 
parties with respect to the appeal filed in this case with the 
Utah Court of Appeals, as Case No- 890379-CA. " (Attached as 
Addendum 3.) This version of the Satisfaction was accepted and 
signed by counsel for Majestic. 
This argument is not well founded, is wholly without merit, 
and should be rejected by the court. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT IV 
WEST VALLEY CITY'S BRIEF COMPLIES WITH THE UTAH RULES 
OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. 
Majestic's assertion that West Valley City's Brief does not 
comply with the rules and should therefore be dismissed is 
wholly without merit. It is an attempt to put form over 
substance, and should not be considered by this court. 
(Lawrence v. Valley National Bank, 478 P-2d 79 (Ariz. 1970)) 
Contrary to the contentions contained in Majestic's 
argument, an analysis of the West Valley City Brief reveals 
seventeen separate citations or references to the record, 
including ten quotations, some more than a page long. The Brief 
gives a fair representation of the facts relating to the issues 
presented. Certainly, the Brief meets the goal of enabling the 
appellate court to understand what particular errors were 
allegedly made, where in the record those errors can be found, 
and why under the applicable authorities those errors are 
material ones necessitating reversal or other relief. 
(Demetropoulos v. Vreeken, 754 P. 2d 960, 962 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988) Majestic takes particular issue with the Statement of 
Facts in West Valley City's Brief. The City's Statement of 
Facts in the present case is concise as to the factual basis of 
the case. This court has stated its displeasure with Statements 
of Fact which are mere catalogues of pleadings and papers and 
burdened with minutiae. (Demetropoulos at 961) 
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Majestic's contention that the City has failed to marshall 
all the facts supporting Majestic's position is also unfounded. 
With regard to the bonus value that the trial court awarded to 
Majestic for their interest in the land, West Valley City did, 
in fact, marshall all the evidence on that issue in its Brief. 
A discussion of that issue is contained elsewhere in this Reply 
Brief. The remaining issues rciised by West Valley City are 
questions of law rather than fact, and West Valley City carries 
no burden in that case. The marshalling of evidence and 
application of the clearly erroneous standard only apply to 
factual determinations by the trial court and are therefore 
inapplicable when reviewing questions of law. (Mountain States 
Broadcasting v. Neale, 776 P.2d 643, 646 (Utah App. 1989); 
Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 88 (Utah App. 1989); Bell 
v. Elder, 782 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah App. 1989)) 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the trial court 
made significant errors in determining the compensable interest 
in this case. It is also clear that Majestic is unable to 
adequately explain or justify those errors. There was no 
evidence presented which supports an award to Majestic for the 
value of the land. In all of the evidence presented by 
Majestic, the bonus value that was awarded is clearly derived 
from the value of the buildings and improvements rather than the 
land. Majestic is suggesting that it is proper that the 
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buildings and improvements be counted not only in determination 
of the land value, but that they also receive compensation for 
the buildings and improvements under the clear provisions of the 
lease. Majestic's own appraiser found that, as to land value 
only, Majestic had no compensable interest. The trial court's 
determination that Majestic receive compensation for the value 
of the land is clearly erroneous and this court should reverse 
that finding. 
It Ms also clear that the trial court's failure to value 
the property as if unencumbered and the trial court's 
interpretation of the condemnation clause in the lease should be 
reviewed on a "correctness" standard. When reviewed under this 
standard, the evidence and the case law plainly reveal that the 
trail court's rulings were incorrect. These incorrect rulings 
lead to Majestic receiving compensation they were not entitled 
to. By incorrectly interpreting the condemnation clause, the 
trial court awarded Majestic value in the land even though the 
plain terms of the lease require otherwise. This court should 
reverse that ruling and restrict Majestic to the compensation 
allowed in the lease, namely the apportioned share of the 
buildings and improvements. 
The trial court's failure to value the property as if 
unencumbered led to an incorrect total value. If this court 
should find that Majestic is entitled to a compensation award 
for interest other than that awarded for buildings and 
improvements, then the court should find that the value of the 
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encumbering leasehold interests were improperly used to find the 
fee value of the "unencumbered whole1' and should, therefore, 
remand the case with instructions to reduce the judgment by that 
amount the leasehold value contributed to the value of the whole 
parcel. 
Finally, Majestic's contentions that West Valley City has 
failed to comply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure and that 
the City has waived its rights with regard to certain portions 
of the appeal, are not based on fact, are without merit, and 
should not be entertained by this court. 
DATED this 13th day of August, 1990. 
Attorney for Appellant, West 
Vaklfey City 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I, the undersigned, certify that on August /^ 1990, I 
mailed, postage prepaid, four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Appellant's Reply Brief to the following parties: 
Robert S. Campbell, Jr., Esq. 
Clark W. Sessions, Esq. 
Paul T. Moxley, Esq. 
Matthew C. Barneck, Esq. 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
Attorneys for Majestic Investment Co. , Respondent 
170 South Main Street, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
\r^LC^ 
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ADDENDUM 1 
RULING 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WEST VALLEY CITY, a municipal 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MAJESTIC INVESTMENT COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation, THE LOCKHART 
CO.; PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS 
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, a Federal 
corporation, and DOES 1 
through 10, 
Defendants. 
RULING 
CIVIL NO. C-87-6899 
This is a condemnation action wherein West Valley City seeks 
to condemn the interests of Majestic Investment Company, lessee 
of the property in question. West Valley City has already 
settled with the owner of the property. The lessee, Majestic, 
was not a party to. nor participated in that settlement. 
The property in question was leased by the owner to 
Majestic, and consisted of vacant and unimproved land and rights 
of way. The lease was executed in April of 1975 for a term of 
35 years at $750.00 per month, with various CPI escalations. The 
lease permitted the lessee to construct office buildings with a 
required minimum value, and the lease contained a condemnation 
clause which read in part: 
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. . . The term herein demised and all rights 
and obligations of the lessee hereunder shall 
immediately cease and be adjusted as of the 
time of such condemnation. Lessee shall have 
claim and right to share in and receive that 
amount of such award as represents that 
portion of the buildings and improvements 
erected on the demised premises by lessee of 
which the number of months from the date of 
such taking by condemnation to the date of 
expiration of this lease bears to the total 
number of months, whether the term herein 
demised, to wit: 420 months. 
Shortly after execution of the lease, Majestic constructed a 
building and leased the same on a long-term 25 year lease to 
Prudential at $375.00 per month for 3 00 months, plus a determined 
amount in regards to the building and costs therein for a total 
rental amount of $1,112.00, subject to certain periodic 
adjustments. That lease contained a condemnation clause 
providing that the sublease terminated upon condemnation and 
Prudential would not share in the proceeds, except for a pro-rata 
share of any improvements Prudential might have made. 
At approximately the same time, Majestic constructed a 
building and leased the same on a long-term 25 year lease to 
Lockhart for $375.00 per month for 300 months, plus a determined 
amount in regards to the building and costs, for a total amount 
of $961.10 per month for 300 months. This lease also contained a 
condemnation clause terminating Lockhartfs rights in the event of 
condemnation, and prohibiting Lockhart from any share in the 
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condemnation, except as to any pro-rata share for any 
improvements made by Lockhart. 
This matter is scheduled for trial on December 13, 1988. 
Both parties have requested a preliminary ruling by the Court as 
to the methodology by which Majestic's interest is to be 
evaluated in this condemnation action. 
The City's position is that in condemnation, property must 
be valued as a whole unit as if unencumbered, and then 
apportioned between the owner and the lessees, with the owner 
receiving value of his reversionary interests and the lessee 
receiving value for his leasehold interest. However, such may be 
changed by agreement and the City claims that in this case 
Majestic is limited in what it may recover by the lease with the 
owner. More specifically, the City claims that the condemnation 
clause of the lease does not provide the lessee with a share in 
the compensation award, or any interest that it may have, except 
as to an interest in the buildings as set out in the lease. 
Particularly, it is argued that the lessee is not entitled to a 
share in regards to future lost rents. 
The lessee, Majestic, takes the position that it has a 
constitutional and compensable interest in property which cannot 
be ignored by the condemning authority (West Valley City), and 
for which Majestic must be paid just compensation. It argues 
that while in many cases the fair market value of only single 
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ownership is equivalent to the fair market value of other 
interests in the property, where premises are subject to a 
strong, enduring leasehold with prime rated tenants, the fair 
market value of the property must take into account and consider 
the value which the prime leases add to the fee simple estate. 
Majestic claims it is entitled to fair compensation for the value 
of its leasehold, and that value should take into consideration 
the subleases. Majestic further claims that such rights are not 
limited by the primary lease, that in order to be excluded from 
its just share of the compensation, the lease must clearly and 
unequivocally state such, and that the lease in question does not 
by clear and specific language exclude the lessee from its share 
in the compensation. Majestic claims that its 35 year primary 
lease, its construction of two bank buildings, its 25 year 
subleases to Triple A tenants, and the fixed rentals over the 25 
year period give the property added value that would not 
otherwise have been present but for the subleases, and that such 
should be taken into consideration. Otherwise, the City will 
have reaped illegal and an unjust windfall. 
The Court has given this matter careful consideration, and 
rules as follows: 
The owner is entitled to just compensation for the taking of 
its reversionary interest in the property in question. It has 
already settled with West Valley City. 
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The lessee is entitled to just compensation for the taking 
of its leasehold rights to the property in question. The value 
of Majestic1s leasehold must take into consideration all leases 
because of the particular facts in this case, to wit: the length 
of the primary lease, the provision for and contemplation that 
Majestic would improve the property with minimum value 
requirements, the construction of buildings and improvements by 
Majestic, and Majesticfs long-term 25 year leases with 
substantial lessees with rent certain. 
There must be a determination of the fair market value of 
the property as a whole, taking into consideration the value of 
the land, the buildings and improvements, and the leases, 
including the subleases. From this determination there must be 
an apportionment as to the owner's interest and Majestic's 
interest. 
Majestic is also entitled to a share of the buildings 
constructed and improvements made by it as provided in the 
condemnation clause of the lease. 
The lease does not preclude Majestic from recovering its 
fair share of the award for its leasehold interest. There is no 
language in the lease that precludes or limits Majestic from 
sharing in a compensation award. To preclude such recovery, the 
preclusionary language must be clear and unequivocal. This lease 
merely states that in the event of condemnation, the rights and 
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obligations of Majestic shall cease "and be adjusted as of the 
term of such condemnation." This is not sufficient to terminate 
Majestic!s rights to its fair compensation. The fact that the 
lease further provides Majestic with a share in the buildings 
which it constructed does not limit Majestic1s rights to also 
share in the compensation award as to its other interests. 
In this case West Valley City has already made a settlement 
with the owner of the fee. Majestic was not a party to that 
settlement. And, that settlement cannot limit or otherwise 
affect the amount to which Majestic is entitled. There still 
must be a determination of the fair market value of the property, 
taking into consideration the land, buildings and improvements, 
and leases as well as a determination of the portion of such 
value to which Majestic is entitled. 
Dated this c3-0 day of November, 1988. 
/ 4> / JL&rTia rcC ^ P\U S'*cry^ 
LEONARD H. RUSSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Ruling, postage prepaid, to the following, this 
day of November, 1988: 
Robert S. Campbell, Jr. 
H. Dickson Burton 
Attorneys for Majestic Investment Co. 
310 S. Main, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Harold A. Hintze 
3319 N. University Ave., Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84 604 
Paul T. Morris 
J. Richard Catten 
2470 S. Redwood Road 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
Joseph J. Palmer 
Wayne G. Getty 
15 East 100 South, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1915 
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DEBRA J . M O O R E 
CASS C. B U T L E R 
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J. Richard Catten, Esq. 
Assistant City Attorney 
2470 South Redwood Road 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
Re: West Valley City v. Majestic Investment, et al. 
Court Appeal No. 89-0379-CA 
Dear Mr. Catten: 
Under date of November 3, 1989, 1 received without prior 
notice your letter together with a West Valley City warrant in 
the sum of $181,961.32 and a form for Partial Satisfaction of 
Judgment which you requested that 1 sign. 
I have consulted with my client upon his return to Utah 
and I am authorized to advise you that your proposed tender of 
monies and Partial Satisfaction of Judgment is invalid and 
rejected. 
The bases for our determination is simple. The tender 
has been made on the premise that the judgment of the district 
court was severable or somehow bifurcated in specific, 
departmentalized components, viz., MajesticTs share in the 
Prudential and Lockhart buildings and improvements vis-a-vis the 
land. The amended judgment of Just Compensation makes no such 
distinctions. It is not a severable judgment but rather one 
which merges all facets of the trial into a single non-severable 
judgment upon which interest at 8% ran to the date of judgment 
with 12% post-judgment interest presently running. 
The case law is clear that a tender of part payment of 
judgment which attempts to sever the judgment into segregated 
parts, is invalid and improper. Accordingly, I return to you 
your proposed form of Partial Satisfaction of Judgment which I 
decline to sign, as well as your warrant dated November 3, 1989 
in the sum of $181,961.32. 
W A T K I S S & C A M P B E L L 
J. Richard Catten, Esq. 
November 18, 1989 
Page 2 
As I indicated to you by telephone, if you wish to make 
a non-conditional tender of payment and partial satisfaction of 
the Amended Judgment of Just Compensation, we will have no 
objection to that and will accept the same and acknowledge such 
further partial satisfaction. 
Sincerely, 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. 
Attorneys for Majestic 
Investment 
RSC/dd 
cc: Majestic Investment 
Harold A. Hintze, Esq. 
ADDENDUM 3 
PARTIAL SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT 
Harold A. Hintze, P.C. A-1400 
OLSEN, HINTZE, NIELSON & HILL 
3319 No. University Ave., Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-6600 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Paul T. Morris, #3738 
West Valley City Attorney 
J. Richard Catten, #4291 
Assistant City Attorney 
247 0 South Redwood Road 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
Telephone: (801) 974-5501 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WEST VALLEY CITY, a Municipal 
Corporation, : 
PARTIAL SATISFACTION 
Plaintiff, : OF JUDGMENT 
vs. : 
: Civil No- C87-6899 
MAJESTIC INVESTMENT COMPANY, : 
a Utah Corporation; and DOES : Judge Leonard H. Russon 
1 THROUGH 10, : 
Defendants. : 
I, Robert S. Campbell, Jr., Attorney for Majestic Investment 
Company, in this action, acknowledge a parcel satisfaction of a 
judgment rendered against Plaintiff in the Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, Utah, in an eminent domain action. 
Judgment was entered by the Court on February 15, 1989, on the 
following parcel of property: 
PARCEL 1. 
Beginning at a point on the West side of 2700 
West Street, said point being South 865.72 
feet and West 50.00 feet from the N.E. corner 
of the N.W. 1/4 of Section 33, T. 1 S., R. 1 
W. , Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running 
thence: S 00°00'44" W. 90.67 feet along the 
West line of 2700 West Street; thence S. 
89°56'20" W. 156.22 feet to a point 30.00 feet 
East of an existing building; thence running 
parallel to and 30.00 feet away from the said 
building for the next three courses and 
distances: N. 00°00'44" E. 2.33 feet; thence 
N. 00°00'44" E. 88.34 feet; thence N. 89°56'20" 
E. 129.22 feet to the point of beginning. 
Contains: 0.270 acres 
Parcel 2. 
Beginning at a point on the West side of 2700 
West Street, said point being South 956.39 
feet and West 50.00 feet from the N.E. corner 
of the N.W. 1/4 of Section 33, T. 1 S., R. 1 
W., Salt Lake Base and Meridian and running 
thence: S. 00o00'44" W. 90.67 feet along the 
West line of 2700 West Street; thence S. 
89°56'20" W. 156.22 feet to a point 30.00 feet 
East of an existing building; thence running 
parallel to and 30.00 feet away from the said 
building N. 00°00'44" E. 90.67 feet; thence N. 
89°56'20" E. 156.22 feet to the point of 
beginning. 
Contains: 0.325 acres 
TOGETHER with an easement for sewer, water and 
other utility purposes, and a right of way for 
ingress and egress over the following 
described property: Beginning at a point on 
the West side of 2700 West Street, said point 
being South 1047.06 feet and West 50.00 feet 
from the Northeast corner of the Northwest 
quarter of Section 33, Township 1 South, Range 
1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and 
running thence South 00°00'44" West 18.0 feet 
along the West line of 2700 West Street; 
thence South 89o56'20H West 4 82.16 feet; thence 
North 00°00,44H East 18.0 feet; thence North-
89°56'20" East 482.16 feet to the point of 
beginning. 
ALSO TOGETHER with an easement for sewer, 
water and other utility purposes, and a right 
of way for ingress and egress over the 
following described property: Beginning at a 
point South 865.72 feet and West 179.22 feet 
from the Northeast corner of the Northwest 
quarter of Section 33, Township 1 South, Range 
1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and 
running thence South 89°56'20" West 30.0 feet 
to an existing brick building; thence along 
said building for the next three courses and 
distances: South 00°00'44" West 58.34 feet; 
thence South 89°56f20" West 27.0 feet; thence 
South 00°00f44" West 123.0 feet; thence North 
89°56f20" East 30.0 feet; thence North 
00°00f 44" East 93.0 feet; thence North 
89°56?20" East 27.0 feet; thence North 
00° 00'44" East 88.34 feet to the point of 
beginning. 
BEGINNING at a point on the West side of 2700 
West Street, said point being South 865.72 
feet and West 33.0 feet from the Northeast 
corner of the Northwest quarter of Section 33 
Township 1 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian, and running thence South 0°0,44" 
West 181.34 feet along the West line of 2700 
West Street; thence South 89°56'20" West 17 
feet; thence North 0°0,44" East 181.34 feet; 
thence North 89° 56'20" East 17 feet to the 
point of beginning. 
This Partial Satisfaction of Judgment acknowledges that judgment 
was entered in favor of Majestic Investment Company on the 15th day 
of February, 1989 for the sum of $364,888.36, less the sum of 
$69,198.00 tendered incident to the order of immediate occupancy, 
or a net deficiency judgment of $295,690.36, together with interest 
at the rate of 8% per annum from the date of occupancy to the date 
of judgment in the sum of $31,108.80. Accordingly, there was a net 
deficiency judgment, inclusive of interest through February 15, 
1989 in the sum of $326,799.16, together with taxable costs, as the 
Just Compensation payable to Majestic Investment Company. 
This Partial Satisfaction of Judgment further acknowledges 
that as of the 3rd day of November, 1989 there was due and owing 
as the Just Compensation, inclusive of post-judgment interest at 
12% per annum, the sum of $356,130.28. As of said date, West 
Valley City paid to Majestic Investment Company and its counsel the 
sum of $181,961.32 by City warrant No. 40368, leaving a net and 
outstanding judgment due and owing to Majestic Investment Company 
of $174,168.96, which judgment will continue to bear interest at 
the rate of 12% per annum on the net principal judgment, which 
calculates to $47.62 per day from November 3, 1989, until full 
satisfaction is paid by West Valley City in the matter. 
It is further acknowledged that this Partial Satisfaction of 
Judgment shall have no effect on the rights, standing or obliga-
tions of the parties with respect to the appeal filed in this case 
with the Utah Court of Appeals, as Case No. 890379-CA. 
DATED this 11th day of December, 1989. 
f ^ , f ^ 
ROBERT S. CAM«B*S&^ JR. 
Attorney for Majestic Investment 
Company 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
S S . 
On this 11th day of December, 1989, personally appeared before 
me Robert S. Campbell, Jr., signer of the foregoing instrument, who 
duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
\(* - ' "" ^^/^r X <?^^7\. StL IY PUBLIC 
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
